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ABSTRACT
This paper establishes that, far from being able to derive the principle
of horizontal equity from utilitarianism, the principle is actually in-
consistent with utilitarianism in a variety of circumstances. We derive
conditions under which (a) it is optimal to impose random tax schedules
(ex post randomization); and (b) it is optimal to randomize the tax schedules
imposed on a set of otherwise identical individuals (ex ante randomization).
The implications for optimal tax theory are discussed. More generally,
it is shown that there are a number of potentially important economic
situations with which the principle of horizontal equity may be incon-
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Theconceptof horizontal equity has long had a special place
in public finance. In particular, the iiposition of a'ndo Lax
would generally be viewed to be unfair. Most econonists
would say that such a tax is "hoizontaily inequitable. More
sophisticatedeconornistc night distinguish between cx ante horlzontal
equity and cx post horizontal equity: if the tax were acplied ina
truly random way, then cx ante it would be horizontally equitable;
individuals with identical utility functions and endowments would have
identicalex ante expected utility, since they all face equal chances;
x post, it would be horzontally inequitable since individuals with the
same endowments and tastes may have very different values of realized
This paper is a revised version of IMSSS Technical Report 2l4 (Sti1itz
(l976a)). Since tuis paper was written closely parallel results to
those reoorted in Section 4 were independently derived by I. Weiss
(1976). The author is partcular1y indebted to extended discussions
with Richard Arnott and Gary Yohe. I should also like to acknowledge
helpful discussions with Frank Hahn, David Newbery, James Mirrlees, Harvey Rosen,
Daviebevan, onyAtkinson and £arryNa1ebuL. Lather versions ot LOiSpaperweie
presentedto the Warwick SummerWork'hop (1976) ,tothe mathematical
economics seminar at Oxford, and to the public finance seminar at
PLct L LJ to tb irt' rct er sc as
CLl :ifulc-ac::;. i--:cccthcth:Naticr:l 'er
Foundation is gratefuliyacknowleoged.utility. But most economists would dgrcc withMusgrave(1976) that
it is ex post horizontal equityinwhich we are interested. (These
arguments cannct be pushed oo far: the draft lottery can be thought
of as a random tax applied to a particular subgroup of the population,
and it did receive widespread ——thoughfar from universal ——acceptance.)
Indeed, so basic is the notion of horizontal equity that It is
incorporated in the Constitution (jf the United States in the 3tequal
protection clause.T' The government may not treat. differently individuals
who are, for the purposes at hand, otherwise identical.
Horizontal equity is usually presented ac a principle in its
own right. It is not derived from other principles. Nor is there
any discussicn of the relationship of this principle with other
principles. For instance, is it ever inconsistent with Pareto optimality?
If it is, does one of the principles have priority over the other?
In recent years there has developed a large literature on optimal
tax structures, using a utilitarian (or more general, social welfare)
criterion.' This approach provides a simple and useful framework
within which altnrriativ structures can be evaluated. Most of this
literature has, however, ignored the question of horizontal equity.2
The question naturally arises, can the principles of horizontal equity
be derived from a utilitarian (or more gei.ieral social welfare) criterion?
See for instance, Ramsey (1927), Diamond and Mirrlees (1971), Stiglitz
and Dasgupta (1971), Atkinson and Stiglitz (1972), and Nirrices (1971).
In thesepapers, thegovernir.ent is assued to seek, witiin a certain class
of taxstructures, that which maximizes, u3, where u is the utility
J of the jth iniv1dita1 ,ormoreenerc1ly,nindivi.ualisticsocial welfnre
fun ion 0Ftb?frr ..i".')whorew/)u >',arAw i
funet.onof it argum2nto. Iora recently, tig11tz J981) has etteLapted to
characterize the set ofParetoefficientta structures,
2Withsomeexceptions.See Stiglitz (1972), Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976,
1980).The object of this paper is to show that it cannot) Indeed,
we establish that the principle of horizontal equity may be inconsistent
with utilitarianism. That is, social welfare (as measured by the sum
of utilities) is higher if individuals who have the same tastes and
the same endowments are treated differently.2 Even more strongly, we show
that horizontal equity may be inconsistent with the principle of
Pareto opt imality.
Most of our analysis is focused on the desirability of random
taxation.We show that random taxation may lead to a Pareto improvement.
The implications of our analysis extend, however, to a wide variety of
social decisions. Thus, in Section 6 we present several other contexts
in which horizontal equity is either inconsistent with social welfare
maximization (utilitarianism) or with Pareto optimality; and In Section 9,
we discuss briefly the implications of our results for earlier analyses
of optimal tax structures.
Our analysis also has implications for pricing policies of
monopolists: in Section 8 we show that it may be desirable for
regulated and unregulated monopolists to randomize prices.
At least from the form of utilitarianism represented in the optimal
tax literature, See below, Section 9.
2
The same results may be obtained wltn other social welfare functions
as well.
That horizontal equity may not he consistent with Pareto optimality
is perhaps not as surprising as it first sounds —thefamiliar story
of the two shipwrecked sailors with only enough food for one (so horizontal
equIty entaIls both dying) at least shows the possibility of a contra-
diction. We are suggesting that conflict among these principles is more
common than such exanpies may suggest.—4—
We conclude with some speculative remarks about the implications
of our results for the role of the conceptof horizontal equity in the
analysis of questions of public policy.
2. Utilitarianism and Horizontal Equicy: The Conventional View
The intuitive derivation of the principle of horizontal equity
from utilitarianism is a special application of Lerner's(1944) argument for
progressive taxation. Assume two individuals 'A' and"B" have identical
incomes and utility functions
UA(cA)uB(cB) i cA
where C is the i—th individual's consumption:
i i C =Y —i
where is his income and T is his tax payment. Thus, if we
maximize social welfare
max {13A(VATA) + HB(yB -TB)}
{TA,TB}
subject to the revenue constraint
TATB > R
it is clear that if Ui"<0, i.. e. there is diminishing marginal utility
A B /. . A B
ofincome, cptmality cnta1 C =C.Seeigura 2.1)Thus,if Y
TA TB,
equal taxes paid by identical individuals. Concavity (in this caseof






With a concave utility function and lump sum taxation, individuals
with same Y should face the same taxes.
Y-T—L Y-T—5—
Foundations will attest, every well behaved problem is concave. The
modern corollary of Marshall's dictum that nature abhors discontinuities
is that nature abhors non—concavities, and it is this, I suspect, that
provides the intuitive rationale for the widespread belief in equality
andthebelief that the belief in equality can be justified by
1
utilitarianism.
It is my belief, on the contrary, that a variety of problems of
economic irterest exhibit non—concavities of the sort that imply that
social welfare maximization may require unequal treatment of equals.
Such is the case of indirect taxation to which we now turn.
We consider two versions of the problem of random taxation. In
the first, the individual knows his tax rate before he decides on
his labor inputs, in the second, he is only told his tax rate after
he has supplied his labor (although he knows the probability dis-
tribution of tax rates before he decides on his labor supply.) In
both cases, randomization may be desirable, although the conditions
under which it will be desirable differ in the two cases. In both
cases, we focus on the desirability of a small degree of randomization;
that is, we provide conditions in which a slight randomization in
the tax rate would lead to Pareto improvement (in terms of cx ante
expected utility); it should be noted that there may be cases where
1Since, as we shall show, this belief is not correct, one can only
surmise why someone might have come to such a belief. Talks with
economists a a large number of institution3 lead ma to believe
that some argument, such as that given here, though usually slightly less
formally presented, lies behind their conclusion.—6—
a slight randomization would not be desirable, but a "large" randomi-
zation would. Thus, the case for randomization of taxes is ronger
than that presented here.
3. Randomization of Taxes Prior to Labor Decision
3.1 The Model
In this and the next section we consider the simplest possible
model of indirect taxation: there is a single good (C) and lhor
(L). We assume that in the absence of taxation, the wage is unity
and the price of output is unity (this is just a normalization)
and that output is proportional to labor input. Let T be the tax
rate and p the (after tax) price of consumption goods (relative to
labor numeraire). Then1
(3.1) p =1 T
We write the indirect utility function
(3.2) V V(p,I)max U(C,L)
s.t. pC < L + I
There is no lump sum taxation, and no profits, so income apart from
that generated by work is zero;2 hence I0. Wa can easily derive
the individual's consumption function, using Roy's identity,
C =C(p,I)=— V(p,I)/V1(p,I)
For simplicity, we assume that the price of tput remains unchanged
throughout the analysis (the production technology 'is 1.Lnear.) The
results are, however, more general.
2
The result extendstothe case where there is lumpsumtaxatioii but
distortlonary taxation is also employed. Thus, the results may be
extended in a straightforward way to linear income tax schedules,
See below, Section 5.—7 -
Assume,for simplicity, there are two identical individuals. We
wish to maximize social welfare by choosing a pobability distribu4op,
of tax rates on consumption.. We focus on the simplest casewhere
one individual will face a low tax rate and theother individual will
face a high tax rate. We randomize the taxes, so eachindividual has
exactly an equal chance of facing the high tax rate(A —1)and
the low tax rate (B —1).Thus, his expected utility can be
writtenas
A B
(3.3) w =V(p,O) +V(p,O)
Since the two individuals are identical, maximizing ex ante expected
utility is equivalent to maximizing social welfare using anyindividualistic
social welfare criterion. Moreover, if we use a utilitarian criterion,
maximizing ex ante expected utility is equivalent to maximizingthe
sum of (ex post) utilities, i.e.
vA(pA0) +VB(PB,O)
where superscripts A and B refer to the different individuals.
In either interpretation, we need to maximize W subject tothe
constraint that the government raise the requisite revenue:
(34) (A -1)cA(pA,o) + (B -1)cB(pB,o) >R.
3.2 Derivation of Sufficient Conditions for Randomization
Theindifference curves in (A,E) space may be concave or convex.—8—


















-dCY —dl5'"income" elasticity of consumption
The derivation of (3,7) is given in Appendiic A.
1In risk analysis, this is known as th measure of (relative income)
risk aversion. In the analysis of income inequality, it is sometimes

















Y =pC,"income"B B B
C+ (p —l)C
-p
A A A C + (p —l)C
p.
T = , thepercentage taxrate
p
Theconstraint curve (the set of values of and satisfying
(3.4)) also may be either convex or concave. Its slope is
(3.8)(4P)
dpR
Using (3.8) ,wecalculate its curvature as
B B A, A A







+(A —l)cA + (- l)cA
p
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V= ,thecurvature of the demand curve.
p
At the 450line,(dpA/dpB) (dpA/dpB) =-lso we ha,e either
w R
a local maximum or minimum,dependingon the relative curvature of the




To see what is implied by (3.11), we first observe that if we
restrict taxation to "efficientt' levels (where increasing tax rates increase
revenues) then
-I —
= C+ (— 1)
dp
(3.12) =C{l—-r(E+ ri)]>0
Multiplying(3.12)throughby 1 — +n)andcollecting terms, we establish:
a sufficient condition for randomization' is that
(3.13) i(p —— 2fl—\))>
The larger the revenue to be raised (T) and the more negative
the curvature of the demand function, the more likely is random taxation
to be desirable.
Thisis alsoa necessary condiica fc the ;irb!lity of a 'small"
randomization;itis possible, however, that although "small" randomizations






























Let us consider the two polar cases:
(a) At T=0,randomization is never desirable.
(b) At the maximum feasible revenue,
1
Hence from (3.12) and recalling the definitions ofE,r,and \,
weobtain a sufficient condition for the desirability of randomizat4p









An example may help illustrate the conditionsunder which randomization
is desirable. Consider the indirect utilityfunction
v ={-kp +'>0





p ='(5+ SiI> 0
=-(1+ )




_pC ,theshare of "full income" spent onconsumption goods. L+ I
m =-(I+ L).
We require that individuals be riskaverse (m >— Y). Thus,substituting





In particular if the price elasticity ofconsumotjo is less thpn
unity
< 1,
for Sufficiently large revenues (so 1 = rar1domizat--on n +c ' -
isdesirable.
3.4 Intuitive Interpretation in TermsofExcess Burden
The basic intuition behind our argument can beseen as follows.
In Figure 3.2a we have plotted the excess burden (EB) (deadweight loss)imposed on an
individual as a function of the revenue raised from him.Clearly, if
the curve is concave at the requiredrevenue, R, it pays to introduce
some randomizaticn, for then average excess burden will be reduced.Thus
a sufficient condition for random taxation to be desirable is that—13—







the elasticity Oi excess burden with respect
to the tax rate.




As igure 3.2b illustrates, the percentage increntin excess burden from
an increase in the tax rate will be smallif the consumption demand
curve is convex.
These conditions can perhaps be interpreted more easily in terms
of a tax on labor. Let t be the tax on labor, andL be labor supply.
Then, we obtain as before that randomization isdesirable if
dlnEB=dlnEB /dlnR < dlnRdint /dint







Excess Burden as Function of
Revenue Raised
Figure 3,2b














the elasticity of the excess burden withrespect to the tax rate
is less than one plus the elasticity of the laborsupply with respect
to the tax rate.
Notice that it is the uncompensated elasticities which are relevant
here, for it is the uncompensated elasticities which are critical in
determining the shape of the revenue function.
3.5 An Alternative Interpretajon
Thereis an alternative interpretation that willprove useful
in some of the subsequent discussion. In Figure 3.3 we havedepicted
the relationship between the revenue raised from an individual(by
means of a proportional consumption tax) and the utility he attains.
(The curveisderived from plotting, in the lower right hand quadrant,
therelationship between the revenue raised and the tax rate, and in
upper left hand quadrant, the relationship between the utility attained
andthe tax rate.) This utility—revenue curvemay not be concave;
clearly, if it is not, we can increase average utility by concavifying
thecurve (as in the diagran).To collect the average revenue R, it is
optimal to collect the revenue from some individuals and the
revenue R2 from others.
3.6The Optimal RandomizationScheme
Sofar, we have establishedthat some randomization is preferable
tonorandomization. enowanalyze the optimal random tax structure.
Let F(r)bethe proportion f individais—15-




(3.16a)ITC(l + T,O)dF(T) >R
(3.16b)fdF(T) 1.
Letting p and y bethe Lagrange multiplier associated withthe constraints,
we obtain
(i.17) V(1 + T,O) + pTC(l + 'r,O) yfor all Twithpositive density
V(1 + T,O) + pTC(l + T,O) <yotherwise.
We now prove there exists an optal probabilitydistributiofl of positive
density atatmostW9 points.
Assume not. There are then at least threetax rates, T1< <
withrelative frequency Tt., Thr.1, yielding revenues (per capita)
of R., for an average revenue R, with < R < and yielding utility
levels V.,withaverage utility level V, V1> V > V3.From(3.17),
V. is a linear function of R. Hencethe same level of expected utility
could be attained simply by randomizing among T1andt3, with
R3-R
The resultis obvious,of course, from the concavificatiOn ofthe
utility—tev. iecur)ailustraLed lu Figt 3..—16—
3.7 Randomization of Optimal Linear Income Taxes
In the simple model we have developed here, with identical
individuals, there is no real reason to impose a distortionary tax:
a uniform lump sum tax would clearly be preferable. It is only because
individuals differ, say, in their abilities, but these differences are
not directly observable, that we need to resort to distortionary taxation.
(See Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976, 1980).) Our analysis can be easily
extended to show that the optimal linear tax structure involves randomization
of the marginal tax rate on consumption.
To see this, assume we have a distribution of individuals by ability
(before tax real wage) given by G(w)) With a linear tax structure, the
individual's budget constraint is given by
C1+(l—t)wL
where I is the lump sum payment to each individual and t is the
marginal tax rate. The individual's utility is represented by his
indirect utility function, now written as a function of the after tax
wage rate and the lump sum payment,
=(w(1—t),I)
Assumethegovernment can impose different marginal tax rates randomly;
as before, half the population faces a rate of tA, half a rate of tB.
The government wishes to
1For a more extended discussion of optimal linear tax structure, in the
absence of randomization, 3ee tiglitz (1976c).—17—
maximize 4ffV(w(l—tA),I)dG(w) + fV(w(l —tB,I)dG(w)]
{I,tA,tB}
subject to the budget constraint
4![tAwL(w1 —tA),I)+ tBwL(w(l —tB),I)]dG(w) =i+
where R is the government's expenditure (per capita) on public goods
(taken to be fixed).
The analysis proceeds exactly as before. We take (for the moment)
I to be fixed. ThentA = isalways a critical point, but it may
be a local minimum rather than a local maximum. We can derive expressions
analogous to (3.13) and (3.14) ——butnow involving appropriately weighted
averages of the demand elasticities, risk aversions, etc.——providing
sufficient conditions for randomization.
There is one problem with the implementation of the kind of random
tax scheme we have described in this section.
Since whether the individual will be faced with a low or a high
tax rate is an insurable risk with no moral hazard associatedwith it,
clearly individuals would be willing to purchase insurance toreduce this
risk. If perfect insurance were purchased, the individual's behavior
would be identical to that with no randomization, and obviously then
randomization would have no effect. Thus, it is apparent tha sociall C —
optimalityrequires, in this case, restrictionson the set of insurance
markets which are allowed to operate)
4. Randomization of Taxes After Labor Decision
The reason that random taxation was desirable in theprevious
section was, roughly, that the amount of revenue raised increasedmore
than proportionately to the tax because of the differences inresponse
of labor supply to different after taxwages. Thus, the average tax
rate could be reduced by having some individuals face a high tax
rate and some a low rate.
In this section, we consider the case where the individual must
decide on his labor input prior to knowing the tax. If the individual
is risk averse, he will "plan" on facing a high tax rate, and henceeach
individual will reduce his labor suppiy by less than he otherwise
would; this enables the average tax rate to be reduced. Individualsare
There may be no scope for insurance of the conventional kind (the
individual pays so much to the insurancecompany if his tax rate is low,
receiving some fixed amount if his tax rate is high). Whether such
policies are desirable, and the nature of these policies, depends on
the value of V1. If V1 0, as itmay (the marginal utility of income
does not depend on the real wage), then there is noscope for such insurance
contracts. If V <0,then the insurance contract actually leads the
indIvidual with the higher tax rate topay money to the individual with
the lower tax rate. With normal demandcurves, this would decrease the
desirability of randomizaton of a consumption tax, since it willredistribute
consumptiouawayfrL.mhighly taxed indijidu.als. The inaurancconjracts
maymake randomization undesirable, and ttiegovernment may need to
intervene to restrict such insurance markets.—19
worse off because they face the risk arising from the random tax.
They are better off because they face a lower average tax rate. We
shall show that this second effect can dominate the first; randomization
may increase everyone's ex ante expected utility.
It is more convenient in this section to take th2 tax as
one on labor; the individual is assumed to face the tax rate t+ A
with probability .5,andtA with probability .5, where A > 0.
Now, we take the price of output as our numeraire (p =1).The
individual chooses L to
(4.1) maximize
U((ci + —t)L,L)U((u —A-t)L,L) w
wherew is the real wage rate. The revenue constraint is now
(4.2) tL =R.
Since individuals are all identical, maximizing the individual's
expected utility is equivalent (as before) to maximizing social welfare.
In Appendix E ,weshow that
n (4.3)dw\ 0
dA,J A0
















Hence, as Figure 4.1 illustrates randomization is desirable if
t
d2t A2 L — (4.o)-•
= Lt<—t dA
(A)
Thereduction in the tax rate depends on three factors:
(a) The responsiveness of labor supply to risk. Variability
in after tac wages increases or decreases labor supply (Rothschild—
Stiglitz (1971)),depending on the concavity or convexity of the
first order condition (U1w + U2 =0)in terms of the wagew.
(The change in the after tax wage is a mean—preserving spread in
the wage distribution.) Clearly, a necessary condition for the
desirability of randomization is that risk increases labor supply
(a2L/A >0).(Later we provide conditions ensuring that this will occur.)
(b) The responsiveness of labor supply to taxes. The more
that an increase in taxes reduces labor supply, the greater the return
from being able to reduce the (average) tax rate, and thus the more
likely that randomization will be desirable.
(c) The size of the required tax revenues R. When t=0,
2










Tosee the effect of large revenues, we cbserve that the
denominator of (4.6) can be rewritten as
47 1Lt1 dtLl dR (.)+tL_Ldt Ldt
The value of t which maximizes revenues without randomization is
denoted by t*, and the corresponding value of R by R*. Thus,
(4.8) t =l/
=1/elasticityof labor supply.
The maximal tax rate ia the inverse of labor supply elasticity.
Thus, if risk increases the labor supply and if there exists a
maximal revenue without randomization of R*, for sufficiently high




Indeed,for sufficiently large government expenditures, theonly
ising the requisite revenue may be to randomize. For, if
at t*, randomization increases labor supply, clearlygovernment
revenue will be raised.
4.1 Derivation of Sufficient Conditions for Randomization in Terms of
Utility Functions
To see more generally the conditions under which randomization is
desirable, we need to express d2t/dA2 in terms of the utility function.




—t)2+ 2U21(w —t)+ U22—22—
and
BL U L(w-t)+U L + U
U(w
—t)2+ 2U2(w -t)+ U22
Substituting(4.9) and (4.10) into (4.6) and that into(4.4), we
obtain
d2 —UL tU L(w—t)+2tU +tLU 2
(4.11) =1 111 11 + U L
dA2 1 + U11(w -t)2+ 2U21(w -t)+U22
The denominator of (4.9)—(4.11) is unambiguouslynegative (provided that
the tax rate is below that which maximizesrevenue). Hence a sufficient
condition for the desirability of randomizationis that (from (4.4)),
2
belarge (and negative)relative to p ; from (4.6)) this will be
dA 2 -
thecase if---5islarge (and positive), which from(4.9), will be
true if U111 is positive and large.It is clear not only that U111
can be positive, but it can be very large,in which case randomization
will be desirable (for t large enough).
4.2 Separable Utility Functins
To get a better idea of the kinds ofconditions under which
randomizationmight be desirable, assume we had aseparable utility





UC IJC (4.13) —A 2_=.JL.+1—
p U11 1
UC
= +(1 + p)
11
A is the elasticity of
,theindividualTs risk aversion.
Substituting into (4.9) and (4.10) we obtain
(4.14) — L = P L




(415) 4L_ (p —1)L
(w— t)(p+)
Thus, randomization leads to increased labor supply if
A >1—p
and increased taxation reduces the labor supply if
p <1.





Thus,with separability, if there is rapidlydecreasing relative risk
aversion (A is very large), andomizatjon becomes desirableeven at low
tax rates.—24—
These results, like those of the preceding section, may seem
rather counterintuitive: after all, one is imposing more risk onthe
individual. Yet, remarkably enough, the condition wehavederived
(in the simple case of separable utility functions) suggeststhat
randomization may be attractive even with high risk aversion.
There are two effects of randomization. First, it imposes arisk
on individuals. By the usual kinds of arguments,the welfare loss
can be sho to be of the order of (for small risks)pA2/2. At the
same time, it affects labor supply; the change in aggregatelabor
supply affects the (average) tax rate; changing the average taxrate
changes the deadweight loss associated with the tax. The deadweight
loss is approximately







Thus, the deadweight loss is inversely related (for constant elasticity
supply functions of labor) to the aggregate labor supply.If aggregate
supply increases when we randomize, i.e. if —>0 is sufficiently
large, then the effect of the benefit from reduction in the averagetax
rate is greater than the lOSS from the induced risk.—25—
One interpretation of the kind of random taxation we have discussed
in this section is the random enforcement of taxes. (Fixed costs of
auditing increase the desirability of random audits.) This inter-
pretation has been discussed at greater length by Weiss (1976)
5. The Randomization of the Optimal Tax and Optimal Randomization
In the preceding two sections we established the desirability of
randomization for linear tax structures. In this section, we ask, what
can we say about optimal randomization of linear tax structures, on the
one hand, and the randomization of optimal non—linear tax structures,
on the other.
5.1 Optimal Ex Post Randomization
In Section 3.6 ,weestablished that the optimal ex ante randomization
(i.e. randomization before the individual has decided on his level of effort)
required only two tax rates.1Here, we show that ex post randomization
entails O1'7threetax rates.
Formally,the government wishes to find a probability distribution of
tax rate represented by F(t), which maximizesindividuals' expected utility
subjectto the government's budget constraint, i.e.
1Thegeneralization of that result to n coiodities and labor requires
randomizationamong n + 1 tax structures.—26—
(5.1) max[max fu[(w —t)L,L]dF(t)1
L
(5.2a) s.t. LftdF(t) >
(5.2b) fdF(t) 1.
A necessary condition for this is that wemaximize expected utility,
given the labor supplied, i.e.from the individual's first orderconditions
for optimal L, we have
-
(5.3) f[U1(w —t)+ TJ2IdF(t) =0.
Letting p be the Lagrange multiplierassociated with the revenue
constraint (5.2a), y be the Lagrange multiplierassociated with the
constraint (5.2b), and ibethe Lagrange multiplier associated with the
constraint (5.3), then
(5.4a) U(( —t)L,L)+pL+ ip[U1(w —t)+ U2] =I if t occurs with
positive probability
(5.4b) U((w —t)L,L)+pLt+[U1(w —t)+ UI <I otherwise
To see that there need be at most three tax rateswhich occur with positive
probability, assume the contrary, i.e. t1 >t2 > t3> t4alloccur with
positive probability .Letting'rr. =therelative frequency of t.,T. =1.
L. 1j1
Define




If {t1,t2,t3,tFdo in fact occur with relative frequency irin the optimal




Thus reformulated, this is simply a linear maximization problem
subject to two linear constraints, and the result is inediate.
5.2 Ex Post and Ex Ante Randomization
In the two preceding sections, we analyzed separately ex post and
ex ante randomization. In fact, the optimal taxstructuremay entail
both simultaneously; that is, individuals are told, before they decide
on the level of effort, that they will face one of tworandomtax
lotteries, one yielding, say, tA — withprobability and t +
with probability 1 -A,the other yielding with probability
and tB + with probability 1 — Giventhat ex post randomization
is desirable, the desirability of ex ante randomization may be analyzed
exactly as before, but now, for each avera level of tax,wecalculate
the optimal random distribution and the associate level o expected
utility and average revenue.
5.3 Randomization withplTaxes
This paper has focused on the desirability of randomization when
the government is restricted to employing linear taxes. The question
naturally arises, is randomization desirable if this restriction is
removed? Does randomization, for Instance, arise simply because of the
second best nature of the problem?—28—
On the contrary, it turns out that Paretoefficient taxation, with
individuals differing say by ability as in themodel of Section 3.7
entails randomization under much weaker conditionsthan those derived
in the preceding two sections. The use ofrandomization enables the
government to distinguish between highand low ability individuals, at
a lower cost (in terms of thedistortions imposed). The analysis of
this problem involves rather different techniquesthan those employed
here, and hence is taken up elsewhere. (See Stiglitz(1981).)l
6Other Contexts where TJtiiitariaflisrnIm1ies Horizontal Ineqy
There have been several other contextsin which utilitarianism
implies horzontal inequity:
(a) The efficiency wage hypothesiSMirrlees (1975) and Stiglitz
(1976b) have analyzed the optimal distributionof income in a family
farm in which the productivity of the
individual depends on the wage
he receivas (the amount of food heconsumes), as in Figure 6.1.
1This resul.t is, in fact, a special caseof a more general theorem about






A(w) gives the number of efficiency unssupplied by an individual
receiving a wage UOptimalityin general entails some individuals
receiving a low wage, some a high wage. Indeed, introducinginequality
may be ex post Pareto optimal. When everyone receives thesame wage,
they are all unproductive, and output is low. Giving a few
individuals a lot more enables them to work so hard that not only
do they produce enough to provide the extra food that they consum.,
but they have some left over to give to the remaining low wage
individuals.
(b) The optimal town: Mirrlees (1972) has shown that in the optimal
townthe utilitarian solution entails inequality: individuals who
arerandomly assignedto live furtherfrom the center enjoy more
land and have a higher level of utility. By crowding individuals
near the center, the transport costs of all those further out are
reduced, and this gain in efficiency more than offsets the inequality
generated thereby.
(c) Fixed training costs:1 Assume everyone is ex ante the
same,and there are two types of jobs to be performed. One requires
trainingcosts T (denominated in say the labor numeraire). Thus, some
individuals are (randomly) assigned to the high training cost industry,
others to the low training cost industry. It can be shown that those individuals
who are (randomly) assigned to the industry requiring training will,
in the utilitarian optimum, work harder and have a lower level of utility.
By making these individuals work harder, expenditures on training
costs are reduced; in effect, net national product can be increased,
at the cost of some increase in inequality. Unless society has infinite
inequalityaverin (using theAtkinson .neasurc o lnequ1lty),it always
pays to introduce some inequality.
Thisproblem was discussed in Stiglitz (1973). ornia1 derivation
of this result is contained in Stiglitz (l976a)—30—
These examples have one feature in common: they lack,in one
way or another, the concavity propertywhich is required for utili-
tarianism to imply horizontal equity. In thefirst ("efficiency wage")
problem, inequality in income raises netnational product by increasing
average productivity; in thethird (training cost) probleffi, inequality
in the labor required of different individualsraises net national
product by reducing the expenditure on trainingcost; in the second
(optimal city) problem, inequality in the land raise
net national product byreducingtotal expenditure on transport costs.
In some situations, lifetime equality may beattained, even though
there is, at any moment, inequality. Thus, inthe optimal town problem,
if it were costless to move individuals, wecould rotate individuals
among plots of land so lifetimeutilities were identical. But this
is not possible for the training cost problem. Inthe optimal tax problem,
if individuals can save, then again randomization mayentaillifetime inequality.
In all of the situations examined, randomizationis Pareto optimal:
ex ante expected utility is maximized bythis kind of inequality.
7.Marketsand Inequality
It is thus not surprising that in situationssuch as those discussed
in this paper but arising in market contexts,there will be a tendency
for the market to introduce randomization.For instance, consider the
problem of financing specific trainingcosts. The efficient way for the
firm to recover those training costs is to impose,in effect, a lump sum
tax on all workers, but this may notbe desirable; if individuals do notknow their ability prior to training, they would piefer an "income tax,"
i.e. a piece rate less than the value added.1 Assume for administra-
tive reasons that the piece rate cannot be made a function of the number
of items produced (i.e. we must have a linear income tax.)2 Then
equilibrium may entail a random piece rate. Perhaps this provides
part of the explanation of random promotion policies (equivalent to
random wages) used by some universities.
Note that so long as individuals have a free choice of occupations,
the wage contract must entail individuals who are ex ante identical
receiving the same level of expected utility.
(Similarly, a developer developing a new residential town and selling
off the plots of land, could he better off (i.e. increase his profits)
by having a fixed fee for a plot, having the plots of different sizes,
and randomly assigning individuals to a plot.)
In the kind of situations we have depicted, the market allocation
may not be Pareto efficient for two reasons. First, it may be difficult
to enforce random contracts; in the example described earlier, with fixed
trainingcosts, the worker who receives training works harder, but receives
the samewage, as the one who does not receive training. In such a situation,
there is obviously an incentive for some other firm to bid the worker away.
If it is not possible to restrict labor mobility, then the market equilibrium
The parallel between "income taxes" and "piece rates" is discussed at
greater length in Stiglitz (1975).
2
This assumption *3notessential, it is made only to convert the problem
at hand direc:iy Lnto one which is equivalent to that analyzed in Section 3.
More generally, £twouldappear chat even ifnon—linear piece rates were
admissible, raneomization may be desirable, butwe havenot analyzed the
conditions under which this willbetrue.— L
willrequire that all (ex ante identical) individuals receive the same
level of utility (ex post); the market, in these situations, entails
excessive egalitarianism.
Second, in the training cost problem presently under consideration,
the optimal resource allocation requires, in effect, subsidies from the
trained workers to the untrained, or conversely.As we noted earlier,
if there were a single government—controlled firm, it would pay equal
wages to all workers, but randomly assign some workers to the plant not
requiring training and some to the plant requiring training. It would
require that the latter workers work harder (longer). Although the workers
so assigned might well complain, the cx ante expected utility of all workers
is maximized by this randomization. But the utilitarian allocation is not, in
general, viable under competition. For in general, the revenues
raised from the sale of one commodity will not be equal to the
expenditures on wages plus training costs: there will be a subsidy
in one direction or the other. It is obvious, then, that the equili-
brium cannot be sustained by a laissez—faire competitive equilibrium.1
8. Random Pricing by Regulated and Non—Regulated Monopolies
It is by now well recognized that there is a close relationship
between the analysis of optimal tax structures (Ramsey and his
descendants) and the analysis of optimal pricing of public utilities
(Boiteux and his descendants). Thus, our remarks about the desirability
of random taxes apply directly to the problem of pricing of regulated
utilities.
1For proof, see Stigiicz (1976a).-33..
But our analysis also shows that there are conditions under which
an unregulated monopolist may find randomization desirable. We noted
earlier, for instance, that the maximiztion of government revenue may
entail randomization of prices (tax rates). Thus, if production were
controlled by a single monopolist, he would, in these circumstances,
randomize his prices.
Similarly, the optimal entry deterring strategy for a monopolisc
may entail randomizing its prices.
1
Consider a monopolistic firm wishing to maximize its revenue;
assume it has a long term contract with its customers; the contract
specifies the "price distribution" which it will charge (the commodity
is assumed not to be storable).The customer has a reservation
expected utility level, i.e. at any contract yielding a lower level of
expected utility, he purchases a substitute for the given commodity.2
Then the problem of the monopolist is maximizing revenue subject
to this expected utility constraint as opposed to our problem,
maximizing expected utility, subject to a revenue constraint. Formally
the two problems are simply dual to each other. Thus under perfectly
analogous conditions to those presented here, the monopolist will find
it desirable to randomize his prices.
4See Salop (1979), Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980) and Gilbert and Stiglitz
(1979) for more general discussions of entry deterrance.
2
Newbury (1978) has explored one version of this application of our
general r'odel.—34—
9. Implications of our Analysis for the Theory_ps Optimal Taxation
and the Usefulness of the Concept of Horizontal Equity
Most of the literature in the theory of optimal taxation (surveyed
in Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980)) has focused on characterizingfirst
order conditions for the maximization of social welfare. Our analysis
has made it clear that this may be insufficient: under notunreasonable
circumstances these may characterize a local minimum ratherthan a
maximum.
Although we have formulated the problem in terms of two absolutelyidentical
individuals, the issues we have raised arose, in slightly disguised form,
in the standard opta1 tax problem. Consider, for instance, two
individuals one of wh2m.likes brown ice cream (but obtains zero
utility from white), the other of whom likeswhite ice cream. Assume
they have identical demand functions. Assume moreoverthat the costs
of production of white and brown ice creams areidentical. Thus, if
Tis the tax rate on brown ice cream, Tthat on white ice
b
cream, then in the conventional optimaltax problem, there may be three
critical points, atT =T,atT > T •andat T < T .One
b b b i
might well consider solutions with Tb Thorizontally inequitable,
but such a solution may be a local utilitarian maximum.The optimal
tax structure is, in any reasonable sense,horizontally inequitable.
Many economists would, accordingly, reject the asymmetric
solution in which the two colors of ice cream are treateddifferently.
Presumably, a true beliaver in utilitarianism would not.
But let us now assume that there are, within the population,two
groups of indiiduals distinguished, say,only by hair color. Recall
that we showed earlier then there were two alternative interpretations—35—
of our results. We focused on the situation where we treated all
individuals ex ante identically, and thus randomization was (cx ante)
Pareto optimal; but even if type A individuals always were taxed at
a higher rate, and type B individuals always were taxed at a lower
rate, social welfare (using the utilitarian ctiterion) was increased
as a result of taxing them at different rates. A strict utilitarian
would thus have no way of choosing between a tax system which randomized
taxes (resulting in identical ex ante expected utility) and one which
always taxed light haired individuals at a lower rate than dark haired
individuals; moreover, under the conditions provided in the earlier
analysis, he would argue that a tax system which differentiated
between light haired and dark haired individuals is preferable to
one which did not.
Is there a difference between the analysis of the tax treatment
of "brown" and "white" ice cream lovers, and the fair haired and dark
haired individuals with identical labor supply functions? The question,
seeiAngly, hinges on what are admissible distinctions. But there is,
within the utilitarian framework as it has customarily been applied
to the analysis of tax structures, no way of determining what are
and are not admissible distinctions. If hair color or sex is not
admissible, why should a seemingly equally capricious aspect of an
individual, the color which he likes his ice cream, be the basis of
differentiation? If the preferred color is not an admissible basis,
should the preferred flavor ——chocolateversus vanilla ——beadmissible?
And if the choice among ice creams is not admissible, should the
choice between ice cream and cheese be an admissible1 basis, or the
The fact that the technology for prodl1cing two colors of ice cream
may be identical, while the techrto.Logies for producing cheese and !ee
creamare different, does nQt, I Hnk, provide a persuasive basis
for differentiation.—36—
choice between goods and leisure? These issues have alwaysbeen lurking
quietly in the background in the analytical discussionsof the structure
of taxation; the point of the simple models presented in thefirst
two sections of the paper is to examine a context inwhich they cannot
be avoided, to present them in as pristine a form as possible.
There are, at this juncture, three approaches that can be taken.
(1) Onecanargue that any distinction is admissible;disriminatiofl
may well be optimal.
(2) Alternatively, one can define aset of admissible distinctions.
This unfortunately removes one ofthe great advantages of the utilitarian
approach to the analysis of tax structures; it presumesthe existence
of a prior principle for the determination of the set of admissible
bases of differentiation.How are we to know, then, that this prior
principle should not, at the same time, be reflected in the design
of the tax structure itself?
The same criticism can, of course, be levied against the principle
of horizontal equity itself. This is usually put as requiring that
"people in equal positions shouldbe treated equally. .." (Musgrave,
1959). But what is meant by "equal positions":are chocolate and
vanilla ice cream lovers in equal positions?Again, it would appear
that the critical question is, what areadmissible distinctions; the
principle of horizontal equity seems toprovide little guidance. As
Rosen has pointed out (1978), "Customarily,'equal positions' are defined
in terms of some observable index of ability to paysuch as income,
expenditure, or wealth." But to choose sayincome or wealth as the
basis is virtually equivalent to definingincome as tiiChorizontal
equitable tox; differential counditytaxes are, by defintior1, then
horjzontallY inequitable.-.37—
Thisapproach attempts to define "equal positions" in terms of
some opportunity sets (income or wealth are used as surrogates for
"ability to pay.") In contrast, Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976) and
Feldstein (1976) have taken a "welfare approach": As Feldstein has
put it,
"If two individuals would be equally well off
(have the same utility level) in the absence
of taxation, they should be equally well off
if there is taxation.
[Furthermore,] taxes should not alter the
utility ordering."
But this formulation too is not completely persuasive: first,
it requires a higher level of cardinality in the utility assessment
even than that required by the utilitarian approach. We must be able
to compare levels of utility as well as differences. Second,
let us consider what this definition implies for our chocolate—
vanilla ice cream example. If initially, the chocolate and vanilla
ice cream sell at the same price, then differential taxation is
horizontally inequitable. But now, assume that the cost of chocolate
is increased slightly. The chocolate lover is "disadvantaged." The
Feldstein formulation suggests not only that we could not use the tax
system to attempt to restore "equality" but that any taxes we impose
must result (if it is to be horizontally equitable) in chocolate
lovers being worse off than vanilla lovers. For example, assume that
the supply elasticity of chocolate is greater than that of vanilla.—38—
A uniform lump sum tax might therefore result, in the new general
equilibrium, in the price of chocolate being below that of vanilla.
In the Feldstein definition, the uniform lump sum tax (which, given
that all individuals have the same endowments, would in the conventional
formulation be horizontally equitable) is thus horizontally inequitable.
In either formulation, virtually any tax system will have some
degree of horizontal inequity; one needs, then, to trade off horizontal
equity with other desiderata of a good tax system. One needs, then,
a Meta—principle for evaluating tax systems.1
3) Finally, we can attempt to retain the utilitarian approach,
but argue that the particular formulation in the current optimal tax
literature is inadequate. The governments ——theindividuals who are
in the possession of the power to exercise the power to tax ——are
not likely to impose a truly random tax. The existence of differential
treatment means that there will be incentives to bribe (in one way
or another) those in the power to determine who is to be treated
favorably. It is this belief in the corruptability of power which
may have provided the motivation for the restriction on differential
treatment in the American constitution. These considerations are,
I think, relevant in assessing alternative tax codes, e.g. in the
desirability of taxing different commodities at the same or different
rates.
1There are ad hoc approaches defining an index of horizontal inequity
and an index of vertical equity, and positing a social welfare function
giving tradeoffs between the two. This seems close to assuming what
is to be analyzed. The index used by King (1980) seems open to
the objections made above.—39—
The dangers of differentiation lie not Only in the favorable
treatment that may be ——andhave been ——obtainedby special interest
groups. Admitting the possibility that some commodity may be taxed
at a higher rate opens up the possibility of using the taxsystem as
an instrument for the (possibly mistaken) public wrath against one
industry or another.
Thus a utilitarian, assessing the advantages anddisadvantages of
alternative tax systems, should take into account how suchsystems
would actually be implemented. It is within sucha broader perspective
that some fonn of the principle of horizontal equitymay well be consistent with
utilitarianism.
1
io. Rawis and Horizontal Equity
Some readers have suggested that there is a close relationship
between the principle of horizontal equity and Rawis' principle of justice.
And just as Rawis argues that justice takes precedence over other social
principles, so too should horizontal equity. Thus, one should not trade—
of f horizontal equity with other social objectives.
But our analysis has shown that each individual's expected utility
may be higher if he is confronted with a random tax structure. Thus,
behind the veil of ignorance, each would favor random taxation, if he
could be assured that the tax would be truly levied in a randomway.
If this view is correct, then the kind of analysis of horizontal
equity contained in Feldstein, Rosen and King may not be focusing on
the critical issues. Within a general equilibrium context, changes
in taxes —-likechanges in technology affect different individuals
very differently. Welfare rankings ifthey could he defined ——
maywell be reversed. But there is notriing sacred about the pre-
tax ranking. Whatweare concerned with is some notion of arbitrary
distinctions.—40—
But the individual maynotbelieve that the tax would be levied in
a truly random way. Indeed, aware of the corruptability of government,
he might reason that if the Constitution allows differential taxation
(of commodities, individuals, etc.) then the political process will
result in some individualbeing advantaged relative to others, Simply
because of their ability to exercise political power. Thus differentiation
would clearly violate the principle of justice. And because it may not be
possible to write the Constitution in such a way that it would allow just
differentiation, but that itwouldnot allow unjust differentiation, it
may be preferable simplytorestrict the ability of the government to
impose differentialtaxation.'
11. Concluding Remarks
This paper has established that, far from being able toderive
the principle of horizontal equity from utilitarianism, the principle
is actually inconsistent with utilitarianism in a variety of circumstances;
most notably, we have derived conditions under which randomtaxation is
optimal. Indeed, there are potentially important economicsituations
where Pareto optimality and horizontal equity are inconsistent (inboth
anex ante and ex post sense). Such inconsistencies force us to re-
evaluate our ethical principles: either utilitarianism or the principle
This still leaves a number of questions unresolved: is non—differentiation
consistent with all consumption being taxed at the same rate, or with
all income being taxed at the same rate; the former is equivalent to a
wagetax, and thus implies that interest is exempt from taxation, while
the latter is equivalent to a tax onfutureconsumption at a higher rate
than on a tax onpresentconsumption.—41—
of horizontal equity ——atleast in the conventional forms ——mustbe
abandoned. We have suggested a more general utilitarian approach,
within which the two principles may be consistent, but which, at the
same time, casts considerable doubt on the optiniality of the kinds of
tax structures which have been derived within the conventional utilitarian
framework.—42—
APPENDIXA
Derivation of curvature of indifference curve (Section 3)
A B
a)To show that at p =p
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B 2




we make use of Royts formula
(A.l) V =— CV1





while differentiating with respect to p we obtain
(A.3)V =— (-- V1+cV1);
substituting (A.2) into (A.3 ),weobtain
(A.4) v=- (- v- - )
pp p II I II
Using the Slutsky equation, we have
(A.5) =— () V1+ 2C --V1+
which, with some rearrangement, yields (3.7).—43-.
APPENDIX B
Analysis of Ex Post Randomization
The first order condition corresponding to the maximization
problem (4.1) is




Differentiating W with respect to A ,weobtain
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Sincethe denominator is positive for efficient levels of taxation,
dtis of opposite sign to -
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AtA =0the first term of (B.2) is obviously zero, the second
term is zero, since utility maximization implies
(B.7)-= 0
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The second and fifth terms are zero at A =0;the third term is zero because
of (B.6); the fourth and ninth is zero because of (B.7), the sixth,
eighth and eleventh are zero because at A =0, =0(from (B.5)
and (B.6)), and the tenth is zero because of (3.3) —(B.6).—4 6.-
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